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A more eloquent study of depression would be hard to find, and it is natural to wonder just why Maria is so very sad: whether her sorrow is due to the love affair gone wrong; due to the social straightjacket to which genteel Austrian society confined its women; or even due to that first failure she wrote about, the failure of philosophy (or Kant's philoso phy) to supply point to one's existence. I shall set these questions aside, interesting as they are. Instead, I shall remark upon just two features of her situation, before we go on. Maria does not value other things; and she does not value herself. These absences find expression in that meta phor of a "vast emptiness" that extends "inside" her and "all around" her.
Nothing attracts her, she is "indifferent," and she finds her very self to be Before we look at her considered answer, we should note that Korsgaard is writing here of the value of human beings, rather than the good will, but her remarks are relevant, given the noted (though here unexplored) connection between these bearers of unconditioned value.
We could take her remarks to extend to the good will, since the good will and humanity are both described, at different points in the Groundwork, as having unconditioned value. Rather than wrench them away from their natural focus, however, we would do better to adapt the present discus sion to hers and redirect our attention from the good will to humanity. 
How then does

